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I. INTRODUCTION 
Broadband is reshaping our economy and recasting the patterns of our lives.1 
Every day, we rely on high-speed connectivity to do our jobs, access 
entertainment, keep up with the news, express our views, and stay in touch with 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2017; B.A. 
Business Administration, University of New Hampshire, 2013. I would like to thank Professor Michael P. 
Malloy as well as the Board of Editors of Volume 48 of The University of the Pacific Law Review for help, 
excellent suggestions, and enthusiasm towards my topic; all of my friends, especially Rich, Hoffman, and 
Soule, for keeping me sane throughout the writing process; and my parents, Mark and Debbie, for their endless 
support in everything I do. 
1. FED. COMM. COMM’N, INQUIRY CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO ALL AMERICANS IN A REASONABLE AND TIMELY FASHION, AND 
POSSIBLE STEPS TO ACCELERATE SUCH DEPLOYMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 706 OF THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, AS AMENDED BY THE BROADBAND DATA IMPROVEMENT ACT, 30 FCC 
Rcd. 1375, 4 (2015) (defining broadband as download speeds of at least 25 Mbps and upload speeds of at least 3 
Mbps). 
2017 / A Common Sense Solution to America’s Failing Broadband Network 
976 
friends and family.2 However, broadband is unavailable to many consumers due 
to either high prices or lack of service in their area.3 In order to improve and 
protect American consumers’ access to broadband, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) adopted Open Internet rules on February 26, 2015.4 The FCC 
relied on two main sources of authority as the legal foundation of the Open 
Internet Rules: Title II of the Communications Act5 and Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.6 Despite having these two sources of 
authority, the FCC applied no additional provisions to enhance Internet access.7 
Moreover, the FCC refrained from enforcing many provisions of Title II that it 
believed were not relevant to modern broadband service.8 
The FCC established three bright line rules to protect consumers’ access to 
broadband: (i) no blocking,9 (ii) no throttling,10 and (iii) no paid prioritization.11 
These rules only addressed part of the problem, however.12 As of the 2013 
census, only 63 percent of people in nonmetropolitan areas13 had access to 
Internet that met the FCC’s definition of broadband.14 The current definition of 
broadband requires download speeds of 25 megabits per second.15 Additionally, 
less than half of households with an income of less than $25,000 per year have an 
Internet connection.16 
The National Broadband Plan states that at least 100 million U.S. homes 
should have affordable access to actual download speeds of at least 100 megabits 
per second, actual upload speeds of at least 50 megabits per second, and that 
 
2. Id. 
3. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 514 (2013–2014), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF _GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf. 
4. OPEN INTERNET, FED. COMM. COMM’N, www.fcc.gov/openinternet (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
5. Communications Act of 1934 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C., ch. 5); for background on the 
objectives of the act, see In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601. 
6. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 706, 110 Stat 56 (1996); 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5603. 
7. Id. at 5616. 
8. Id. 
9. See OPEN INTERNET, supra note 4 (stating that broadband providers may not block access to legal 
content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices). 
10. See id. (stating that broadband providers may not impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic on the basis 
of content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices). 
11. See id. (stating that broadband providers may not favor some lawful Internet traffic over other lawful 
traffic in exchange for consideration of any kind—in other words, no “fast lanes.” This rule also bans ISPs from 
prioritizing content and services of their affiliates). 
12. THOM FILE & CAMILLE RYAN, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, 3 
(2014). 
13. Nonmetropolitan areas are defined as “lowest population density public use micro data sample areas” 
and are geographic areas defined for statistical use that are built using census tracts and counties, nest within 
States, contain roughly 100,000 residents, and cover the entire United States. 
14. FILE & RYAN, supra note 12, at 3. 
15. FED. COMM. COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2. 
16. FILE & RYAN, supra note 12, at 3. 
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every American should have affordable access to robust broadband service 
within the next decade.17 It is important to note that these speeds are significantly 
higher than the FCC’s minimum requirement to be considered broadband.18 The 
current state of the industry makes it unlikely that the ambitious goals of the 
National Broadband Plan set forth in 2010 will be met.19 
Consumers in the United States pay more than almost any other country for 
broadband service—while they pay an average of $52.32 per month, they receive 
slower speeds in return, as the country ranks only 16th in peak average 
connection speeds worldwide.20 Consequently, much of the population either is 
unable to afford broadband or is forced to overpay the sole provider in their area 
for substandard service.21 Without the FCC assuring access for competitors to 
existing infrastructure22 on reasonable terms and conditions for competitors, this 
practice of charging more while providing less will almost certainly continue 
unless cost saving measures are put into place.23 
One possible solution would be for local or regional governmental bodies to 
sponsor local broadband providers, like in the form of a public utility.24 However, 
state legislatures have recently attempted to pass laws that would ban such 
municipal broadband providers.25 Lobbyists for large private broadband 
providers have urged state governments to enact laws that would prohibit local 
governments from acting as broadband providers.26 This prohibition would 
protect the current monopoly that broadband providers have on markets.27 To 
address these issues, the FCC must both require municipal broadband provisions 
and enforce cost reduction measures in order to reduce the high barriers to entry 
 
17. FED. COMM. COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN XIV (2010) 
[hereinafter THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN]. 
18. Id. 
19. Sue Helper, How Much Competition Exists Among ISPs, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE (2014), available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/under-secretary-blog/how-much-competition-exists-
among-isps (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that, as a result of price, some 
consumers will opt for slower internet speeds to save money). 
20. AKAMAI’S [STATE OF THE INTERNET] Q3 2015 REPORT, 55 (2015); Price Rankings by Country of 
Internet, NUMBEO, http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/country_price_rankings?itemId=33 (last visited Nov. 
14, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). To calculate peak average speed, an average 
is taken of only the highest connection speed calculated from each unique IP address determined to be in a 
specific country or U.S. state. 
21. THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 17, at 22; NUMBEO, supra note 20. 
22. ”Existing infrastructure” refers to networks of deployed telecommunications equipment and 
technologies necessary to provide high-speed Internet access and other advanced telecommunications services 
for private homes, businesses, commercial establishments, schools, and public institutions. 
23. Helper, supra note 19. 
24. In the Matter of City of Wilson, N.C. Petition for Preemption of N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 160A-340 ET 
SEQ., 30 F.C.C.R. 2408 at 2. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 16. 
27. Id. at 2. 
2017 / A Common Sense Solution to America’s Failing Broadband Network 
978 
faced by broadband providers when entering into new markets.28 By utilizing its 
authority under the Telecommunications Act, the FCC can implement and set the 
best practices for a national “Dig Once”29 policy as well as encourage local 
governments to cooperate with private enterprises, bringing affordable broadband 
to all Americans.30 
Part II of this Comment examines the history of the FCC’s regulation of the 
telecommunications industry and the issues it encountered and continues to face 
today.31 It also discusses recent attempts to solve these problems and the 
obstacles facing these potential solutions.32 Part III of this Comment analyzes 
various successful endeavors by states, as well as private enterprises, in 
broadband deployment to rural and urban areas.33 Part III specifically discusses 
state implementation of a Dig Once policy and the Google Fiber Project, 
proposing that the FCC should push states to adopt such policies by setting out 
the industry best practices learned from successful state and private projects.34 
Such action would allow the United States to meet the goals set by the National 
Broadband Plan in a timely manner.35 
II. THE STATE OF BROADBAND AND THE CYCLICAL HISTORY OF FAILED 
FEDERAL REGULATION 
This Part discusses the various sources of law governing the conduct of 
Internet Service Providers.36 Section A explains the FCC’s authority and the 
effect of the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.37 Section B examines the 1934 Act and its 
effect on interstate commerce, as well as the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
and its attempts to fill in the gaps left by the 1934 Act.38 Section C provides a 
brief history of the Open Internet Order.39 Section D gives an overview of the 
current state of municipal broadband and the issues potential broadband 
 
28. H.R. 3805, 114th Cong. (2015–2016). 
29. See infra Part III. The largest cost element for deploying broadband is typically burying the fiber optic 
cables and conduit. Dig Once aims to reduce this cost by coordinating highway construction projects with the 
installation of the infrastructure necessary to provide broadband. 
30. Infra Part IV. 
31. Infra Part II. 
32. Infra Part II. 
33. Infra Part III. 
34. Infra Part III. 
35. THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 17. 
36. Infra Part II. 
37. Infra Part II.A. 
38. Infra Part II.B. 
39. Infra Part II.C. 
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providers face.40 Finally, Section E outlines the Dig Once policy and the 
legislation attempting to enact it.41 
A.  The FCC’s Authority under the Communications and Telecommunications 
Acts 
The 1934 Act granted the FCC authority to regulate communications 
providers.42 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 amended the 1934 Act 
significantly.43 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 aimed to remove barriers to 
entry into the telecommunications industry in order to increase competition in the 
industry.44 Title I, which describes the general provisions, and Title II, common 
carrier regulation, are particularly relevant to the issues discussed in this 
Comment.45 
Title I lays out the general provisions of the 1934 Act.46 Section 160(a) 
requires the FCC to forbear from applying any regulation or provision of Title I 
to a telecommunications carrier in any or some of its geographic markets if the 
FCC determines that enforcement is not necessary to: (1) ensure just and 
reasonable service, (2) protect consumers, and (3) comply with public interest.47 
Additionally, Title I allows the FCC to “perform any and all acts, make such 
rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as 
may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”48 Acting as a necessary and 
proper clause49 in the administrative context, this provision enables the FCC to 
promulgate rules in support of the goals where it has express authority.50 
This ancillary authority51 is not absolute.52 The FCC must demonstrate that 
its rules are reasonably supplementary rather than merely a policy statement.53 
Using this authority as justification, the FCC adopted four principles, asserting 
that consumers are entitled: (1) “to access the lawful Internet content of their 
 
40. Infra Part II.D. 
41. Infra Part II.E. 
42. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. ch. 5. 
43. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56. 
44. Id. 
45. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 201. 
46. 47 U.S.C. § 151. 
47. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a). 
48. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i). 
49. The analogy here is to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Cf. WILLIAM J. 
RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 35:2 (3rd ed. 2015). 
50. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i). 
51. ”Ancillary authority” here refers to the FCC’s authority to adopt regulations based on the provision of 
Title I of the Communications Act of 1934 that grants the agency general, rather than specific, authority. 
52. U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). 
53. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708 (1979) (requiring that the rules be reasonably 
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s responsibilities for the regulation of television 
broadcasting). 
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choice”; (2) “to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the 
needs of law enforcement”; (3) “to connect their choice of legal devices that do 
not harm the network”; and (4) “to competition among network providers, 
application and service providers, and content providers.”54 
Title II was intended to regulate common carriers,55 setting forth their duties, 
such as furnishing communication upon reasonable request.56 Other provisions in 
Title II provide rates that common carriers may charge and bar unjust or 
unreasonable discriminatory practices.57 Specifically, sections 251(b) and 251(c) 
of Title II were originally designed to reduce the barriers to entry of the 
telephone service industry.58 Such barriers include obtaining regulatory approval 
to use public rights-of-way, buying existing infrastructure to connect subscribers 
to the service, and wiring homes.59 These processes typically take years and are 
extremely expensive.60 Congress originally included these sections to ease the 
burdens on new entrants to the market.61 
B. The Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Communications Act of 1934 into 
law with the purpose “to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of 
the United States . . . a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio 
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”62 The Act 
declared communications technology to be an interstate good and created the 
Federal Communications Commission.63 
The 1934 Act, however, had the unintended effect of creating natural 
monopolies,64 the most prominent instance of which is AT&T.65 From the 1930s 
 
54. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 
14987, 14988 (2015). 
55. 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (defining common carrier as “any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, 
in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, 
except where reference is made to common carriers not subject to this chapter; but a person engaged in radio 
broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier”). 
56. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
57. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202. 
58. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC 
Rcd. 14171, 14177–78 (2015). 
59. See 47 U.S.C. §§251(b)–(c) (protecting against these barriers). 
60. See 11 FCC Rcd. 14171 at 14174–76 (describing the burdens facing new market entrants). 
61. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions, 11 FCC Rcd. 14171. 
62. 47 U.S.C. § 151. 
63. About the FCC, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/guides/about-fcc 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
64. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STA. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969) 
(stating that “[i]f the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather 
than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual number of firms in it”). 
65. American Tel. and Tel. Co., v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 131, 222 (D.D.C. 1982). 
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to the 1980s, AT&T and other telephone companies formed natural monopolies 
similar to traditional utility providers.66 In order to combat these effects, the FCC 
designed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act) to ensure that any 
company that achieved a monopoly in a given region would not abuse its market 
power to the detriment of consumers.67 The 1996 Act aimed “to provide a pro-
competitive, deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate 
rapidly the private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and 
information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all 
telecommunications markets to competition.”68 
After Congress approved the bill, President Bill Clinton signed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 into law.69 The bill implemented necessary 
changes that accounted for the advent of the Internet and encouraged the 
deployment of advanced telecommunications capability nationwide on a 
reasonable and timely basis.70 
The drafters of the 1996 Act believed that the inclusion of provisions calling 
for interconnection71 and wholesale access to incumbent local exchange 
carriers’72 networks would further the Act’s goals by aiding new entrants into the 
market.73 Interconnectedness is important because new entrants to the 
telecommunications market face high barriers to entry, including high threshold 
levels of investment, inefficient economies of scale, and externalities.74 To 
provide market entrants wholesale access to the incumbents’ networks, the 
incumbent local exchange carriers must make certain elements of their network, 
at least those necessary to provide telecommunications services commensurate 
with those of the incumbents, available to entrants at cost-based wholesale 
rates.75 
 
66. “Traditional utility provider” refers to gas, electricity, and water providers; see Joseph D. Kearney, 
From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under 
Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1404 (1999) (describing the evolution of AT&T’s regional Bell 
companies). 
67. 47 U.S.C. § 201. 
68. H.R. 104-458, 104th Cong. (1996). 
69. Id. 
70. Broadband, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/broadband/ (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
71. Interconnection is the physical linking of a carrier’s network with equipment or facilities not 
belonging to that network. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1). 
72. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.5 (defining incumbent local exchange carrier as an entity that was providing local 
exchange telephone service in a particular area on February 8, 1996, the date on which the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 was enacted into law). 
73. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3), 252(d)(1). 
74. Eun-A Park, Barriers to Entry Analysis of Broadband Multiple Platforms: Comparing the U.S. and 
South Korea (Dec. 2007) (unpublished thesis, Pennsylvania State University) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
75. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3), 252(d)(1). 
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C.  The Open Internet Order 
In 2010, the FCC issued the Open Internet Order.76 Initially, broadband was 
classified as an information service regulated under Title I, instead of a 
telecommunications service under Title II.77 The 2010 Open Internet Order’s 
purpose was “to preserve the Internet as an open platform for innovation, 
investment, job creation, economic growth, competition, and free expression.”78 
The no blocking rule,79 transparency rule,80 and no discrimination rule81 were all 
adopted to achieve that purpose.82 The 2010 Open Internet Order sparked 
immense judicial scrutiny, and in Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit ruled upon the 
issue.83 
Verizon v. FCC involved two appellants, Verizon and MetroPCS, both of 
whom opposed the 2010 Open Internet Order.84 The appellants made three 
challenges to the order: (1) that the FCC’s reinterpretation of section 706 as a 
grant of direct authority was unreasonable, (2) that the FCC did not provide a 
reasonable rationale for seeking to promote increased broadband service through 
the 2010 Open Internet Order, and (3) that the antiblockage, antidiscrimination, 
and transparency rules imposed common-carrier requirements on broadband 
providers.85 
The court first concluded that the FCC’s reinterpretation of section 706 as a 
grant of direct authority was reasonable, vesting it with affirmative authority to 
enact measures that encourage deployment of broadband infrastructure.86 The 
court then determined the FCC’s rationale for attempting to promote broadband 
 
76. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010) (report and 
order), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
77. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 631–632 (describing that an information service is only lightly regulated by 
the FCC, while a telecommunication service is subject to more strict regulations). 
78.  25 FCC Rcd. 17905. 
79. See id. at 17906 (describing that a person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access 
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, “shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or 
nonharmful devices,” subject to reasonable network management). 
80. See id. (providing that a person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar 
as such person is so engaged, shall not impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic on the basis of Internet content, 
application, or service, or use of a non-harmful device, subject to reasonable network management). 
81. See id. (describing that a person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar 
as such person is so engaged, shall not engage in paid prioritization. “Paid prioritization” refers to the 
management of a broadband provider’s network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic, 
including through use of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, resource reservation, or other forms 
of preferential traffic management, either in exchange for consideration from a third party, or to benefit an 
affiliated entity). 
82. Id. 
83. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628. 
84. Id. at 627. 
85. Id. at 634. 
86. Id. at 637. 
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services through the Open Internet Order by claiming it caused a virtuous cycle87 
of innovation was valid.88 The FCC claimed that the cycle occurs as follows: 
openness leads to investment and development by edge providers89 in new 
content and applications over the Internet; which causes increased end user 
demand for broadband; which leads to increased investment in broadband 
network infrastructure and technology.90 Despite the fact that the court accepted 
section 706 as a grant of direct authority and found this virtuous cycle to be 
reasonable, it struck down the antiblocking and antidiscrimination rules.91 
The court reasoned that those rules would subject broadband providers to 
common-carriage requirements.92 This would be contrary to the FCC’s decision 
to classify broadband access as a pure information service, which exempted 
broadband providers from Title II’s common-carrier obligations.93 Because of 
this contradiction, the court struck down the antiblocking and antidiscrimination 
rules.94 However, because the court found that the transparency rule operated 
separately and did not impose common carrier regulations, it could be severed 
from the other two rules and remain in effect.95 
The majority opinion in Verizon left the FCC with an opportunity to regulate 
broadband under section 706 as long as it did not impose common-carrier 
requirements on broadband providers.96 The court also suggested an alternative to 
the antidiscrimination rule, through which the FCC could prohibit certain types 
of broadband provider conduct as long it could articulate a workable standard 
that barred only conduct that could be reasonably understood to harm Internet 
openness, while allowing individualized broadband provider practices.97 
Additionally, in regards to the antiblocking rule, common-carrier obligations 
might not be created if arrangements between broadband providers and edge 
providers allowed individualized bargaining at the lowest level of service needed 
to access other Internet subscribers.98 
 
87. See 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 at 17910–11 (stating that virtuous cycle of innovation refers to the idea that 
“new uses of the network—including new content, applications, services, and devices—lead to increased end-
user demand for broadband, which drives network improvements, which in turn lead to further innovative 
network uses”). 
88. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 644–45. 
89. “Edge providers” refers to services such as Google, Facebook, YouTube, Spotify, and Netflix. 
90. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 634. 
91. Id. at 658. 
92. Id. at 657–59. 
93. 47 U.S.C. § 153(51). 
94. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 655. 
97. Id. at 658. 
98. Id. 
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The 2015 Open Internet Order both refined and added to the rules established 
by the 2010 Open Internet Order.99 It promulgated three bright-line rules, added a 
catch-all provision, and made enhancements to 2010 Open Internet Order’s 
transparency rule.100 
The bright line rules established by the 2015 Open Internet Order are an 
antiblocking rule, a no throttling rule, and a no paid prioritization rule.101 The 
antiblocking rule states: “A person engaged in the provision of broadband 
Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block 
lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to 
reasonable network management.”102 The no throttling rule provides: “A person 
engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar as such 
person is so engaged, shall not impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic on the 
basis of Internet content, application, or service, or use of a non-harmful device, 
subject to reasonable network management.”103 The no paid prioritization rule 
prohibits broadband providers from accepting payment to manage its network in 
a way that benefits particular content, applications, services, or devices.104 
The catch-all provision prevents broadband providers from unreasonably 
interfering with or disadvantaging end users and edge providers.105 The rule 
states: 
Any person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, 
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably interfere with or 
unreasonably disadvantage (i) end users’ ability to select, access, and use 
broadband Internet access service or the lawful Internet content, applications, 
services, or devices of their choice, or (ii) edge providers’ ability to make lawful 
content, applications, services, or devices available to end users. Reasonable 
network management shall not be considered a violation of this rule.106 
Thus, the catch-all prevents broadband providers from serving as gatekeepers 
to the Internet and ensures that providers are unable to limit or control what 
information is available to view and use on their network.107 
Finally, the 2015 Open Internet Order requires additional transparency from 
broadband providers.108 While the 2010 Open Internet Order hinted that 
broadband providers should disclose their network management practices, 
performance characteristics, and commercial terms, the FCC received constant 
 
99. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 at 5607, 5609 (2015). 
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complaints from users and edge providers concerning the accuracy and 
availability of the disclosures regarding broadband speeds and billing.109 Thus, 
despite the Verizon court’s holding that the transparency rule would remain in 
effect, the 2015 Open Internet Order was necessary to implement the 
transparency rule’s purpose.110 
D.  Municipal Broadband 
In promulgating the Open Internet Order, the FCC intended to increase 
access to broadband in rural areas, where it is expensive to deploy, while 
lowering costs in areas where it already exists by increasing competition.111 
Many communities wanted to build their own broadband systems but were 
obstructed by state laws written by and for the influential provider industry that 
either barred such systems or imposed onerous conditions on them.112 The FCC 
has been able to thwart some of the state imposed barriers to municipal 
broadband,113 but the existing companies continue to add complications.114 
Another hurdle to overcome in establishing a municipal broadband provider 
is gaining access to public rights-of-way.115 Public rights-of-way are strips of 
land intended for public travel.116 Sections of these public rights-of-way are 
frequently used as the infrastructure for utility companies.117 Currently, state law 
controls local governments’ property interests in public rights-of-way by 
imposing specific pricing for access.118 
As it stands, state governments use a franchise method—requiring that 
broadband providers obtain franchise or license to construct facilities within the 
municipality’s rights-of-way—to grant the use of public land to private 
 
109. Id. 
110. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 at 5670. 
111. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659; 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 at 5670. 
112. In the Matter of City of Wilson, N.C. Petition for Preemption of N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 160A-340 ET 
SEQ., 30 F.C.C.R. 2408 at 74, 86. 
113. See id. at 37 (finding that section 706 gives the Commission authority to preempt any state laws that 
target providers that are political subdivisions of the state). 
114. See id. at 15 (allowing municipally provided service to correct market failures in markets where 
there is little to no existing competition). 
115. A right-of-way is a property interest owned by the state or locality, and ISPs obtain an easement to 
use that interest through fees paid for access; THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 17. 
116. Paul Devaney, AM. PUB. WORKS ASS’N, RIGHTS-OF-WAY MANAGEMENT §1.3.2 (2001), available at 
http://www.apwa.net,Documents/ResourceCenter/Rights-of-Way_Mgt.pdf (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
117. Id. Infrastructure refers to networks of deployed telecommunications equipment and technologies 
necessary to provide high-speed Internet access and other advanced telecommunications services for private 
homes, businesses, commercial establishments, schools, and public institutions. 
118. Mayor of Baltimore v. United States, 147 F.2d 786, 788 (4th Cir. 1945). 
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companies, often creating a natural monopoly in the process.119 Gaining access to 
these rights-of-way is paramount to supplying broadband for smaller or new 
broadband providers.120 Broadband providers’ heavy lobbying in areas where 
they currently operate a franchise has led to frustration and difficulties for would-
be municipal broadband providers.121 
Nearly insurmountable initial costs, which vary with the nature of the area 
(rural or urban) as well as demand, also restrict both municipalities’ and private 
entrants’ ability to deploy broadband infrastructure.122 Deploying just one mile of 
fiber can bear costs in excess of $100,000.123 The bulk of the cost comes from the 
process of burying the fiber underground.124 Laying down the last mile of fiber 
can amount to approximately 75 percent of the total cost of deployment due to 
the amount of time and labor involved.125 
E.  The Dig Once Method 
In May of 2009, California U.S. Representative Anna G. Eshoo introduced 
the Broadband Conduit Deployment Act, which sought to implement a Dig Once 
policy.126 Dig Once is defined as, “Policies and/or practices that minimize the 
number and scale of excavations when installing telecommunications 
infrastructure in highway rights-of-way.”127 The Dig Once method involves 
coordinating highway construction projects with the installation of broadband 
facilities.128 The idea is that that digging once may save costs resulting from 
repeated excavation in areas where the entire right-of-way is paved or 
developed.129 Dig Once would have helped to satisfy the recommendations of the 
National Broadband Plan; unfortunately, it did not succeed.130 When reintroduced 
 
119. NEIL LEHTO, FIRST AMENDMENT AND RIGHT OF WAY ISSUES IN CABLE TELEVISION, IN PROTECTING 
FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION: FIRST AMENDMENT AND LAND USE LAW 173–75 (Daniel R. Mandelker & 
Rebecca L. Rubin eds., 2002). 
120. See THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 17, at 109. (explaining the need for access to 
rights of ways). 
121. See id. at 47 (describing the hodgepodge of existing regulation which hints at the impact of the 
lobbying efforts of current market leaders). 
122. Id. at 109, 114. 
123. Id. at 114. 
124. Id. 
125. Alcatel-Lucent, Deploying Fiber-to-the-Most-Economic Point 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.alcatel.hu/wps/DocumentStreamerServlet?LMSG_CABINET=Docs_and_Resource_Ctr&LMSG_C
ONTENT_FILE=Other/23168_DeployFiber_wp.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
126. H.R. 2428, 111th Cong. (2009). 
127. POLICY BRIEF, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION STUDIES (Oct. 
2013), available at https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/policy_brief_dig_once.pdf [hereinafter FHWA] (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 17. 
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in 2011, the proposed bill called for amendment of the general highways 
provision of the United States Code,131 and mandated that the Departments of 
Transportation (DOT) would require states to lay down infrastructure for 
broadband in conjunction with highway construction projects.132 
The Broadband Conduit Deployment Act would have allowed the DOT to 
exercise its discretion in order to decide the necessary amount of broadband 
conduits, ensuring that multiple providers could be accommodated.133 The DOT 
would have had to consider any existing conduits and potential demand of the 
area when making its decision.134 Additionally, it would have enabled the DOT to 
engage in rulemaking regarding the standards for compliance as well as provide 
states with a waiver.135 The DOT would have been required to work with the 
FCC to establish demand and determine any existing broadband lines.136 
President Barack Obama issued two executive orders, the Federal Permitting 
Order of 2012 and the Broadband Infrastructure Order of 2016, which together 
led the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a study on the 
effects of the legislation.137 The Federal Permitting Order called for a more 
efficient and effective federal permitting and review process.138 The Order 
outlines the necessity of timelines and schedules for completion of reviews as 
well as early and active consultation with stakeholders in order to avoid conflicts 
or duplication of effort between federal agencies.139 This order also created a 
steering committee made up of members of the FCC, the DOT, and other 
agencies.140 The duties of the committee include developing a permitting and 
review performance plan and implementing best practices for federal, state, local, 
and tribal government coordination.141 
The Broadband Infrastructure Order directed the DOT to work with state and 
local governments to develop and implement best practices on issues such as 
creating Dig Once requirements.142 This order designed Dig Once requirements 
to reduce the number and scale of repeated excavations for the installation and 
maintenance of broadband facilities in rights-of-way.143 
 
131. See generally 23 U.S.C. §§ 301–29 (2006) (the sections proposed to be amended). 





137. Accelerating Broadband Infrastructure Deployment, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,903 (June 14, 2016); Improving 
Performance of Federal Permitting and Review of Infrastructure Projects, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,887 (Mar. 22, 2012). 
138. 77 Fed. Reg. at 18,887. 
139. Id. at 18,889. 
140. Id. at 18,888. 
141. Id. at 18,888–89. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
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Shortly after these orders were issued, the GAO released its findings 
regarding a national Dig Once policy.144 It found that a mandatory Dig Once 
policy may result in negative consequences, such as reduced funding availability 
for highway projects, unused conduit, higher administrative costs for state DOTs 
and local governments as a result of maintenance and leasing programs, and 
conflicts with state deployment policies.145 However, the findings also described 
significant potential benefits, such as less frequent highway construction, 
decreased installation costs, greater access and reliability of networks, and 
shorter times required to deploy fiber.146 Consequently, these conflicting findings 
led to a temporary halt to congressional consideration of the Broadband Conduit 
Deployment Act.147 The Act has been reintroduced to the House of 
Representatives as the Broadband Conduit Deployment Act of 2015 and has 
since been referred to the both the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit and 
the Hose Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, but no further action 
has occurred.148 
III. THE SOLUTION VS. THE FAILURE 
This Section discusses the FCC’s decisions, their likely effect, and other 
possible solutions.149 Part A confronts the FCC’s decision to refrain from 
implementing over 700 provisions of the 1996 Act.150 Part B discusses a possible 
alternative solution through previous state efforts, as well as proposals that could 
reduce deployment costs.151 Part C discusses a successful effort between state 
governments and a new broadband provider.152 
A.  The FCC’s Failure to Regulate through the Open Internet Rules 
If the FCC fails to discourage the recent attempts to ban municipal 
broadband, the current monopolistic trends prominent in the industry will persist, 
and the United States will continue to fall behind in broadband access and 
affordability.153 By forbearing from including sections 251(b) and 251(c) of the 
Telecommunications Act when applying the Open Internet Order, the FCC is 
 
144. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BROADBAND CONDUIT REPORT: GAO 12-687R 2 (2012), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591928.pdf [hereinafter BROADBAND CONDUIT REPORT]. 
145. Id. at 4, 6–7. 
146. Id. at 4, 5–6. 
147. Id. 
148. H.R. 3805, 114th Cong. (2015–2016). 
149. Supra Parts III.A–C. 
150. Supra Part III.A. 
151. Supra Part III.B. 
152. Supra Part III.C. 
153. Supra Part III C. 
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failing to regulate what the Act was originally designed to prevent—the barriers 
to entry of the telephone service industry.154 These processes take years and are 
highly expensive.155 As a result, the FCC is missing an opportunity to enforce its 
own regulations that would provide broadband access to a wide range of 
underserved consumers.156 Additionally, the forbearance leaves small broadband 
providers open to frivolous lawsuits from larger incumbents designed to put them 
out of business.157 These issues make it difficult to find investors willing to fund 
an entrant into the broadband market.158 With the FCC legally classifying 
broadband service providers as telecommunications providers, they logically 
should be held to the same competitive standards as other companies to which 
Title II previously applied.159 The result of this forbearance is the current state of 
the telecommunications industry, where a lack of competition due to high 
barriers to entry leads to high prices and reluctance to expand to low population 
density areas.160 
As it stands today, the service area of two companies providing high-speed 
broadband will rarely overlap.161 Currently, only 37 percent of Americans have 
multiple options for high-speed broadband providers.162 Municipal broadband in 
combination with the Dig Once approach could provide a solution to this 
problem as it would introduce competition into the market as well as lower the 
initial costs of entry.163 However, many states still have statutory provisions that 
restrict municipal ownership of telecommunications services.164 
In Arkansas, for example, the Arkansas Telecommunications Reform Act of 
1997 provides that, “a government entity may not provide, directly or indirectly, 
basic local exchange, voice, data, broadband, video, or wireless 
 
154. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(b)–(c). 
155. FHWA, supra note 127. 
156. See, e.g., Press Release, Board of Supervisors President David Chiu Calls for “Dig Once” to Help 
Improve Internet Connectivity and Close Digital Divide in San Francisco (Oct. 20, 2014) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (suggesting that the free broadband access is important for all parts of the 
community for education and the economy). 
157. Park, supra note 74, at 46. 
158. Id. at 179. 
159. Id. (if there are less difficulties finding the investors willing to fund entrants into the broadband 
network market, the competitive standards would be the same across the board). 
160. Helper, supra note 19. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. BROADBAND CONDUIT REPORT, supra note 144, at 5–6. 
164. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-50B-3 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-17-409 (West 2016); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 29-27-103 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.81 (West 2016); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 45:844.47 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 484.2252 (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-594 
(West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 268.086, 710.147 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-340.1 
(West 2016); 66 PA. STAT. ANN. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3014 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2620 
(2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-52-601 (West 2016); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 54.202 (West 2015); VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 15.2-2108.6, 56-265.4:1 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 54.16.330 (West 2016); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 66.0422 (West 2015). 
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telecommunication service.”165 This prevents cities from entering the market and 
providing their own service despite the fact that many cities are being exploited 
or underserved by incumbent providers.166 As shown in the following Section, 
municipalities can function as highly competitive entrants with the help of a Dig 
Once policy as well as their superior ability to finance network construction via 
issuing bonds and operating without profit for a time.167 
The Broadband Conduit Deployment Act of 2015 would help to alleviate the 
burden states like Arkansas place on deploying broadband, but unfortunately 
almost no action has been taken on the bill since its introduction.168 The 
Broadband Conduit Deployment Act of 2015 would specifically require states to 
evaluate the need for broadband conduit to be installed at the same time as a 
federally funded highway construction project.169 If the evaluation shows the 
need to install the pipes in that area in the next 15 years, it would have to be 
installed at the same time as the highway construction.170 Even if the statute still 
forbids the state from supplying the service, the conduit and infrastructure will be 
in place for either an existing or new carrier to affordably enter the market.171 It is 
likely, however, that once states are required to enact a Dig Once policy, such 
statutes forbidding the state from deploying broadband will fail or face 
amendments in order to capitalize on the newly laid infrastructure.172 
B.  Reduction of Deployment Costs Through Dig Once 
The high initial costs required to lay the cable infrastructure for broadband is 
the primary reason that low population density areas are often neglected by 
Internet Service Providers.173 The National Broadband Plan recognizes this and 
 
165. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-17-409. 
166. Id. 
167. Infra Part III. 
168. H.R. 3805, 114th Cong. (2015–2016). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. FHWA, supra note 127. 
172. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-50B-3 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-17-409 (West 2016); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 29-27-103 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.81 (West 2016); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 45:844.47 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 484.2252 (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-594 
(West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 268.086, 710.147 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-340.1 
(West 2016); 66 PA. STAT. ANN. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3014 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2620 
(2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-52-601 (West 2016); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 54.202 (West 2015); VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 15.2-2108.6, 56-265.4:1 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 54.16.330 (West 2016); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 66.0422 (West 2015) (all statutes would either be repealed or amended if states enact a Dig Once 
policy). 
173. See NPR Staff, Austin Is Latest Test Bed For Google’s High-Speed Experiment, ALL TECH 
CONSIDERED (Apr. 9, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/04/09/176687 
467/austin-is-latest-testbed-for-googles-high-speed-experiment (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (the cost to deploy a fiber project in Kansas City is about $94 million to connect 149,000 homes. In a 
low population density area, this cost will be split among fewer end-users). 
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proposes several solutions to reduce the costs of deployment.174 Notable 
initiatives from the plan include detailing a timeline and process for initial access 
and subsequent disputes, improvement of data on location and availability of 
rights-of-way, coordination of processes at the state and federal level, and 
establishing industry best practices.175 
Another possible solution can be found in the proposal for the Broadband 
Conduit Deployment Act of 2009.176 This Act would have ensured that “an 
appropriate number of broadband conduits, as determined by the Secretary, are 
installed along such highway to accommodate multiple broadband providers, 
with consideration given to the availability of existing conduits.”177 The 
Broadband Conduit Deployment Act was rejected, however, and it gave the FCC 
little guidance on whether or how it must determine the basis for requiring 
deployment based on consumer demand or broadband providers’ demand in 
calculating the number of conduits required in an area.178 
1. Minimizing Excavation Through State or Municipal Coordination 
The best solution to reduce deployment costs is to encourage states to 
implement a Dig Once policy.179 Despite many past legislative proposals failing 
of to gain traction, some states have enacted their own Dig Once policies.180 
These policies seek to save money by allowing for installation of infrastructure 
with as little excavation as possible as well as facilitating access to rights-of-
way.181 This is because the most burdensome cost associated with deploying 
broadband is typically burying conduit underground.182 Additionally, about 90 
percent of the cost of deploying broadband occurs when the work requires 
significant excavation of the highway.183 
However, the FCC must be careful not to overstep its bounds as it may not be 
able to ascertain which details of the policy would be most beneficial for each 
 
174. H.R. 3805. 
175. Id. 
176. H.R. 2428, 111th Cong. (2009). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at § 330(b). 
179. FHWA, supra note 127; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY 
ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF POLICY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, EXECUTIVE ORDER: ACCELERATING 
BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT, SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES OF BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT IN 
HIGHWAY RIGHTS OF WAY: SUMMARY PAPER (May 2013), available at https://www.fhwa. 
dot.gov/policy/otps/successprac.pdf [hereinafter ACCELERATING BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT] 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (suggesting that lowered deployment costs would push 
states to implement Dig One policies). 
180. ACCELERATING BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT, supra note 179. 
181. Id. 
182. FHWA, supra note 127. 
183. Id. 
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state. 184 For example, Utah took an informal approach, while Arizona went about 
it in a more formal way.185 
Utah began utilizing Dig Once in preparation for the 2002 Olympics by 
installing a communications conduit system with extra capacity for future use.186 
This policy has continued and now specifies the installation of oversize conduit 
during road construction, facilitating later broadband expansion.187 When the 
state installs small sections of conduit, telecoms cooperate by helping extend the 
infrastructure and provide services to rural communities.188 By using this 
approach, Utah has been able to provide most of its regions with a connection.189 
According to Tara Thue, former manager of the Utah Broadband Project, “This 
saves the State a ton of money as compared to going back in when somebody 
wants to put in a line or upgrade lines, because they don’t have to dig up the road 
again.”190 Thue boasted about the speeds Utah provides, saying, “We’re fastest in 
the West, which is really impressive when you consider the amount of rural areas 
that we have.” 191 Utah ranked fourth in the nation for broadband speed in 
Akamai Technologies’ most recent “State of the Internet” report and is also the 
top ranked state in the nation for home broadband adoption.192 
Arizona enacted a statute that targeting rural broadband deployments that 
were only applicable to road construction or expansions outside of cities or towns 
with a population of more than 10,000 people.193 The statute requires the 
company installing the conduit to provide a minimum level of service.194 
Specifically, companies must provide “access and transport to the Internet, 
computer processing, information storage or protocol conversion at a rate of at 
least one megabit per second . . . as established by the Federal Communications 
Commission.”195 Arizona makes this possible by giving additional authority to its 
 
184. See, e.g., UTAH’S GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, UTAH BROADBAND 
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT (2012), available at http://utahbroadband.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/utah-
broadband-advisory-council-report3.pdf [hereinafter UTAH BROADBAND ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT] (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (an example of a state taking the initiative to address their own 
concerns without the Federal Communications Commission’s intervention). 
185. Id.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-7381 (2012). 
186. UTAH GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ON THE FAST TRACK, 
http://business.utah.gov/publications/on-fast-track/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2017) (on file with The University of 
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DOT to regulate the transportation of information.196 This allows the DOT to 
coordinate the installation of conduit for multiple users in state highway rights-
of-way.197 The legislation brings in additional cost-sharing mechanisms, such as 
requiring Internet companies to pay a “cost-based rate” to lease conduit alongside 
qualified roads.198 
Dig Once is not only effective in rural areas.199 It is more than capable of 
working in high traffic areas as well.200 One of the earlier instances of a Dig Once 
policy occurred in Boston in 1994.201 Boston adopted a policy mandating that all 
telecoms install their underground conduits in the same trench, at the same time, 
on a shared cost basis.202 This gave the local telecoms a main role in coordinating 
and installing telecommunications services for the city.203 
Boston’s policy operates through a lead company, which is the first company 
that approaches the city for a build-out request and is in charge of coordinating 
construction.204 The lead company works with participating telecoms to estimate 
the costs of construction, develop the engineering plan, and apply to the city’s 
Public Improvement Commission for a build-out permit.205 Boston is able to 
exercise power through its s ordinances to manage its streets, which is different 
from most major cities.206 Additionally, Boston is not bound by state 
procurement laws because it works with the telecoms through license 
agreements.207 This led to Boston having fewer regulatory hurdles to work 
through than other cities when laying conduit.208 
San Francisco also adopted a Dig Once ordinance in 2014.209 The ordinance 
demands the installation of -owned communications infrastructure in excavation 
projects where the city has determined that it is both financially feasible and 
consistent with the city’s communications infrastructure.210 This is accomplished 
 
196. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, DIG ONCE: USING PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY TO BRIDGE 
THE DIGITAL DIVIDE, http://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/enews/cs41_1.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
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199. See, e.g., ACCELERATING BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT, supra note 179; CITY AND 
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY, DIG ONCE SPECIFICATION 1 (2015), 
http://sfgov3.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=6885 [hereinafter DIG ONE SPECIFICATION] (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE § 2.4 (2014) (showing that 
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201. ACCELERATING BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT, supra note 179. 
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by: (i) requiring all municipal utilities to take communications infrastructure into 
account in their planning process, and (ii) requiring the establishment of a 
process for the Department of Technology to participate in utility excavation.211 
The first requirement is fairly standard, but the implementation of the second sets 
this ordinance apart from prior Dig Once policies.212 Colombia 
Telecommunications Corporation (CTC) has worked with various stakeholders in 
order to develop technical specifications for Dig Once, criteria for prioritizing 
projects, and a methodology for estimating incremental costs.213 
CTC considered the following factors in developing conduit specification: 
capacity,214 segmentation,215 access,216 costs,217 robustness,218 and architecture.219 
The decision to establish a standard specification comes at the cost of 
compromising the interests among users.220 However, it has the benefit of 
ensuring consistency and predictability in term of cost and deployment.221 
Prioritizing construction allows for a significant reduction in incremental 
costs by ensuring that resources are not wasted building conduit that will likely 
go unused.222 San Francisco’s Dig Once ordinance considers that conduit should 
not be laid down with every excavation.223 Proposing prioritization for: (i) 
construction opportunities that extend over long distances with a diverse range of 
 
211. DIG ONCE SPECIFICATION, supra note 199, at 1. 
212. Compare DIG ONCE SPECIFICATION, supra note 199, at 1, with UTAH BROADBAND ADVISORY 
COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 184 (while it is common for the Department of Technology to participate in Dig 
Once Policies, most do not require a process to be put in place for the Department of Technology to participate 
in utility excavation). 
213. DIG ONCE SPECIFICATION, supra note 199, at 1. 
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internal diameter, to accommodate future users’ cables and to be segmented to enable conduit to be shared or 
cables added at a future date”). 
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217. See id. (“[M]aterials beyond those which are likely to be needed will add cost, as will the 
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220. Id. at 4. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 10. 
223. S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE § 2.4 (2014); see DIG ONCE SPECIFICATION, supra note 199, at 10 
(noting factors that may waste resources such as: excavation projects that extend only a short distance; 
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possibilities for immediate and future use; (ii) opportunities that are close to city 
and community anchor locations requiring service; (iii) opportunities in areas 
where non-city users have expressed interest in conduit; (iv) areas where new 
commercial developments are likely to require city and non-city broadband 
connectivity; (v) areas that are targeted for economic deployment; (vi) areas 
where there are no utility poles on or near the project, or where utilities are 
scheduled to be buried; and (vii) targets of opportunity such as bridges or 
freeway underpasses—thus ensuring that the projects qualifying for priority offer 
the highest cost to potential benefit ratio.224 
Former San Francisco Board of Supervisors President and now 
Assemblyman, David Chiu, plans to bring a citywide free Wi-Fi network through 
the Dig Once ordinance.225 The installation of city-owned fiber has the 
opportunity to make sure that no one is left without high-speed access.226 Chiu 
believes, “Quality broadband service is no longer a luxury. It is a necessity for 
our economy and our education system. You need access to high-speed 
broadband to compete, just as you needed access to water, roads and electricity in 
the 20th century.”227 This is especially true in a city such as San Francisco, which 
has become a hub for innovation and increasingly relies on high speed 
broadband.228 
Dig Once has even seen application outside of state and municipal use.229 
Railroad tracks are almost perfect for laying the necessary conduit because they 
offer linear routes.230 This is how Sprint originally got into the 
telecommunications industry.231 The Southern Pacific Railroad laid thousands of 
miles of telegraph wire along its tracks, eventually announcing that its subsidiary, 
Southern Pacific Railroad Internal Network Telecommunications (SPRINT), 
 
224. DIG ONCE SPECIFICATION, supra note 199, at 10–11 (explaining that prioritization is determined by 
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would offer shared time on its private line network.232 This decision finally 
brought a competitor to AT&T’s longstanding long-distance monopoly.233 
A more recent example can be seen in the Florida East Coast Railroad in the 
1980s when AT&T installed fiber optic cables along Florida East Coast 
Railroad’s lines to reach growing cities.234 The railroad had been leasing the 
infrastructure to telecommunications companies, but recently took a different 
direction.235 Florida East Coast formed a subsidiary called FEC Telcom Inc. to 
enter into the telecommunications industry. 236 By developing a fiber network 
along its rail lines, Florida East Coast’s telecommunications loop reaches 73 
percent of Florida’s population.237 Today, there are also specially designed 
railroad cars that are able to plow cable underground as they move.238 Laying 
conduit this way offers significant cost savings as opposed to assembling conduit 
paths from scratch.239 
The FCC should take note of these successful policies as well as the 
partnership between Google and Kansas City discussed below in formulating a 
streamlined approach that provides states with discretion in order to satisfy their 
specific situations and broadband needs.240 
Such cooperation among broadband providers and local agencies allows 
broadband to be deployed at reduced costs.241 By performing broadband projects 
while simultaneously doing roadwork, state DOTs are able to kill two birds with 
one stone in that they encourage investment and deployment of broadband in the 
area while completing any necessary road or utility repair.242 This is the most 
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2.   Google Fiber: A Successful Experiment 
In 2011, Google selected Kansas City as the first test site for its Google Fiber 
Project.244 While it is still in its infancy with limited deployment, the Google 
Fiber Project looks very promising, yet still has left some skeptical of its 
longevity.245 Essentially, Google has agreed to build, operate, and maintain a 
fiber-optic network with speeds of up to one gigabit per second.246 Not only does 
this far exceed even the goals of the National Broadband Plan, it is also available 
to residents at a cost of $70 per month. The Google Fiber project also offers a 
basic Internet plan where residents can pay a $300 construction fee to receive 5 
megabits per second speeds at no cost beyond the initial construction fee.247 
The project drew the attention of then FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai, who 
noted the need for “states and local communities to adopt broadband-friendly 
policies when it comes to rights-of-way management.”248 After visiting the 
project site, Pai urged others to follow in Google’s footsteps with the 
demonstrated success of its Kansas City partnership and learn how to streamline 
their own rights-of-way management processes.249 Pai also noted that the city’s 
supportive policies were a large part of why Google chose Kansas City for its test 
site.250 
Google continues to expand the project and is currently either functioning or 
developing in Atlanta, Austin, Charlotte, Nashville, Raleigh-Durham, Salt Lake 
City, and San Antonio, with additional expansion planned for the future.251 The 
FCC should heed its own advice and make use of its ancillary authority to 
support and encourage projects like this in other areas.252 In order to spur such 
development, the FCC should develop best practices for management of rights-
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of-way that facilitate broadband deployment while protecting government 
interests. Streamlining the rights-of-way management is what made it possible 
for Google to move into Kansas City with such efficiency.253 
The municipal policies in place in Kansas City were also a tremendous aid to 
the project.254 Most notably, Kansas City waived all fees to its rights-of-way.255 
Google thereby essentially received a taxpayer subsidy in order to incentivize 
development.256 However, others following the project claim that the lack of fees 
played a small role—Google focused more on Kansas City eliminating 
unnecessary costs and delays in the deployment process.257 Either way, the 
project must be viewed as a success, and action needs to be taken by the FCC in 
order to push other stakeholders to make similar investments into the 
infrastructure necessary to deploy high speed broadband. 
High cost is one of the biggest barriers to getting quality Internet service to 
families living in affordable housing programs.258 By bringing affordable Internet 
to low-income families, Google Fiber accomplished what the FCC began striving 
for in the 1934 Act and is still reaching for in the National Broadband Plan.259 
Google Fiber addressed the fact that the United States has some of the most 
expensive broadband in the world, yet is unable to keep up with other nations in 
Internet speeds.260 In doing so, Google Fiber laid down a framework that future 
providers can follow to bring broadband to the rest of the nation.261 
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Internet access can be the difference between success and failure for many 
people.262 Giving children the opportunity to use computers in after school 
programs, learn basic computer skills, go online to finish their homework, take 
advantage of online educational tools, and participate in STEM263 classes can 
help them escape the cycle of poverty the Telecommunications Act sought to 
end.264 However, over the first ten years, the legislation that was expected to save 
consumers $550 billion resulted in cable rates rising by about 50 percent and 
local phone rates increasing by over 20 percent.265 This result is antithetical to the 
very purpose behind the Telecommunications Act.266 Google Fiber has shown 
that it is possible to make broadband both available and affordable to those who 
need it most.267 
With the success of Google Fiber still growing, the FCC should seize this 
opportunity to implement the lessons learned from the project to determine how 
to push current broadband service providers to upgrade their existing networks as 
well as convince new competitors to enter the market in untapped areas. Another 
former FCC Chairman demanded in 2013 that at least one city in every state 
should have a gigabit community.268 This demand is similar to the National 
Broadband Plan, which aims to achieve affordable access to at least one gigabit 
broadband service to anchor institutions such as schools, hospitals, and 
government buildings.269 
If and when the FCC acts, there are three main parties that it must consider: 
(i) consumers who want faster broadband speeds at more affordable prices;270 (ii) 
broadband providers that seek to expand their service and continue to call for 
greater deregulation of rights-of-way access in order to ensure that they can 
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quickly and easily gain access to existing infrastructure;271 and (iii) states which 
continue to assert that the right-of-way represents a property interest that the 
federal government should refrain from restricting if a state seeks to impose fees 
beyond the cost of access.272 
The FCC must introduce a precise regulatory framework that will allow 
states and broadband providers to reach a compromise and work efficiently 
together. As the Google Fiber Project has shown, cooperation is a key element to 
successfully deploying a new broadband network.273 While deployment would 
typically be met with a variety of delays leading to higher costs and more days 
without revenue, the quick and efficient process made Google’s experiment 
extremely successful.274 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The FCC already has the tools it needs to meet the goals of the National 
Broadband Plan. By following the path carved out by Google and Kansas City, as 
well as states like Utah and Arizona and cities such as Boston and San Francisco 
with successful Dig Once policies, high speed, affordable broadband can soon 
become a reality for consumers in areas willing to accept a loss of right-of-way 
fees.275 While initial pushback against losing such a valuable property right is 
expected, once the benefits that Kansas City residents are experiencing are 
realized, many other cities are likely to follow suit.276 
The FCC has a tried and true method of deployment that has been proven 
successful in Dig Once.277 States merely need a push in the right direction for this 
trend to gain momentum.278 The resulting benefits are clear; Dig Once can bring 
broadband to rural areas at a significantly reduced cost, while municipal 
cooperation with a private enterprise will succeed in urban environments, such as 
Kansas City.279 
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Both for those cities that are willing to give up right-of-way fees and rural 
areas with low population density, the Dig Once method will ease the burden on 
those who wish to enter into the broadband service industry.280 Such cost 
reductions are a benefit to everyone: service providers, consumers, and the 
states.281 Increased access to broadband strengthens productivity, raises the 
quality of living in the area, and creates jobs that would not otherwise be 
possible.282 
The tools exist to make America a worldwide leader in broadband, an 
essential factor to the nation’s competitiveness. Broadband drives job creation, 
promotes innovation, expands markets for American businesses, and supports 
improved education, health care, and public safety.283 The precedent set by 
Google Fiber and the potential of the Broadband Conduit Deployment Act of 
2015 are the solutions needed to achieve the goals set by the National Broadband 
Plan, bringing affordable access to robust broadband service to every American. 
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